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One of the most tired debates in American corporate law has been about the 
ends of corporate governance.  Must, within the limits of their legal discretion, 
boards of directors act for the best interests of stockholders?  Or may they exercise 
their discretion to advance, as an end in itself, the best interests of other corporate 
constituencies, such as the corporation’s employees, home communities, and 
consumers?  The reason this debate is a bit tired is because it is not about whether 
corporate statutes should be amended to give equal credence to other constituencies 
than stockholders, it is about arguing that corporate laws that give only rights to 
stockholders somehow implicitly empower directors to regard other constituencies 
as equal ends in governance.  In other words, the debate involves large doses of wish 
fulfillment, with advocates for other constituencies arguing that the law already is 
what they in fact think it ought to be.  Nice as a good fantasy life can be, when one 
emerges from the bliss, reality remains the same, and in this case, it is even worse 
because time that could be spent pushing for actual reforms to give real legal and 
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therefore market power to other constituencies is spent instead on arguing that the 
world is other than it plainly is. 
Particularly problematic about this debate is its ongoing role in helping 
corporations avoid responsibility to the full range of societal interests they affect.  
By continuing to suggest that corporate boards themselves are empowered to treat 
the best interests of other corporate constituencies as ends in themselves, no less 
important than stockholders, scholars and commentators obscure the need for legal 
protections for other constituencies and other legal reforms that empower these 
constituencies and give them the means to more effectively protect themselves.  
Pretending that corporate boards—an odd recourse for ordinary people anyway—
are to be looked at as a source of protection and solace for workers, the environment, 
and consumers dilutes the focus that is actually needed, which is on the protections 
from externalities that other constituencies deserve.  Likewise, by pretending that if 
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corporate boards would just “do the right thing,” non-shareholder constituencies 
would be better off, advocates let another key source of societal power off the hook:  
the money manager agents who control the capital of and wield the voting power of 
ordinary Americans’ retirement and college savings.  This article seeks to ground 
the debate in what should be obvious: shareholders are the only corporate 
constituency with power under our prevailing system of corporate governance in two 
sections.  First, this article reviews relevant parts of American corporate law dealing 
with corporate power to reinforce the tangle those who argue that corporate boards 
can just “do the right thing” get themselves into when trying to explain away settled 
corporate law doctrine.  Second, this article uses the recent history of E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours and Company to illustrate what happens in the real world, when 
corporate boards are faced with the realities that shareholder interests may conflict 




 To buttress the argument that they are correct about the ends of corporate law, 
scholars and commentators often argue that judges and other scholars have gotten it 
wrong.1  For example, the iconic case of Dodge v. Ford (170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 
1919)) did not mean what it said, and those who took it at its word were just not 
linguistically skilled (Johnson, 2013; Millon, 2013; Henderson, 2010; Henderson, 
2009; Stout, 2008).  For example, that the landmark decision in Revlon (506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1986)), making clear that any decision of a board had to be justified by 
reference to the end of the best interests of stockholders, was an exception to the 
rule, rather than making clear what the general rule was always meant to be (Manesh, 
2014; Johnson, 2013; Stout, 2012).  For example, by arguing that the business 
                                                            
1 For those readers unfamiliar with American corporate law, Stephen Bainbridge’s treatise on 
corporate law is an excellent general guide.  Bainbridge, Stephen M. (2009), Corporate Law, 2d 
ed., Foundation Press.  Sections that may be particularly helpful include his discussion on the 
sources of corporate law and Delaware’s important role in § 1.2, and §§ 6-7, which provide an 
overview of the law of fiduciary duty, covering the cases mentioned in this article and many more. 
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judgment rule is not about the utility for stockholders of not second-guessing 
corporate managers who have no motive other than to increase the profitability of 
the firm for the benefit of stockholders (Elhauge, 2005; Greenfield and Nilsson, 
1997).  Central to all these strained arguments is one key factor—in Delaware and 
certain other states, there is no statement in the corporate code that says something 
like:  “Within the discretion allowed to them under this Code and other provisions 
of law, the board of directors shall act at all times with the end of advancing the 
welfare of the company’s stockholders.  Other interests may be considered as an 
instrument to that end, but are not to be considered an end in themselves.” 
 This is, of course, an odd requirement for a corporate statute, for a reason that 
will be central to this article.  A general corporation statute sets up an enabling 
structure to be utilized by human beings (and their entity creations) to create new 
legal structures.  As with the constitution of a human polity, the core insight into 
who is to be served as an end can be found within the terms of authorizing corporate 
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statute itself and who it empowers and who it does not.  By way of example, I am 
glad that there are members of national and state legislatures throughout the world 
who view it important to protect endangered species, natural resources, and other 
interests that are not homo sapien.  Recognizing, however, that human governments 
might decide that protections for wildlife and the environment are important for 
human beings, does not mean that human governments have a multi-constituency 
focus in which things like the environment and wildlife are an end in themselves.  It 
is only when the human beings for whom these governments operate recognize that 
protecting non-human interests is of utility to humans that the governments they 
choose will engage in such protection. 
 That, of course, has a “duh” quality to it.  For that reason, it almost 
embarrasses me to have to explain the obvious, which is that when only humans 
form governments and only humans have any input into who gets to govern, the best 
interests of humans is the plain end for which those governments were formed. 
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 The reason why repeating this duh proposition is critical is that in the 
supposedly ruthless and clear-eyed domain of corporate law, the relationship 
between purpose and power is often ignored altogether, and commonly slighted.  
Rather than concentrating on the central power dynamics established by corporate 
authorizing codes, those who wish to pretend the world is different than it is tend to 
look to particular cases that they believe prove their point (remember the old chestnut 
involving night baseball games at Wrigley Field, Shlensky v. Wrigley? (237 N.E. 2d 
776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)), or the absence of the statement referenced above in the 
corporate statute (Bainbridge, 2007).  From rather obvious points such as that 
corporate law allows Google to have a really great cafeteria, on-site dry cleaning, 
work-out facilities, and good wages (all things that encourage talented people to 
work at, heck, nearly live at Google, to the benefit of stockholders), they vault to the 
much different idea that Google’s board may actually operate Google as a worker’s 
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cooperative where the workers’ best interests are the end, and stockholders are 
subordinate to them (Dwyer, 2015; Pearlstein, 2013; Stout, 2012). 
 But, when one takes the duh example that human governments have as their 
end the best interests of the humans they serve seriously, that lens on corporate 
conduct is piercingly sharp and high resolution.  Under America’s leading 
corporation law, the Delaware General Corporation Law, the board of directors is 
elected by only one constituency—stockholders (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 211(b) 
(2016)).  Under America’s leading corporation law, major transactions that require 
approval by more than the board of directors are subject to approval by only one 
constituency—stockholders (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 251, § 271 (2016)).  Under 
America’s leading corporation law, only one constituency can sue to enforce the 
legal duties owed by directors and managers under the statute, the certificate of 
corporation, and the bylaws, and the fiduciary duties owed by them as a matter of 
equity (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 327 (2016)).  Creditors are the exception that proves 
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the rule: they do not get rights in equity, that is to say the power to sue, until a 
company is in bankruptcy—and even then only the power to sue derivatively—and 
when the creditors are then the residual claimants (North American Catholic 
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 
2007)). 
 These powers translate into purpose because those who run corporations owe 
their continued employment as managers and directors to the only constituency the 
corporate law establishes—stockholders. 
 As a person whose day job involves wearing a robe when I’m in court, I 
suppose I should be chary about suggesting that the role of judges in corporate power 
dynamics is, although critically important in protecting stockholders from self-
dealing by conflicted fiduciaries and ensuring that stockholders’ legitimate 
expectations are vindicated, not meaningful in influencing the determination of what 
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interests corporate managers serve when using their legal discretion.  But, the reality 
is that judges have little clout over that topic. 
 The reason for that is, again, obvious.  Corporate directors cannot subordinate 
the best interests of stockholders to that of other corporate constituencies unless the 
stockholders themselves support that subordination.  And when a conflict emerges 
between the interests of corporate constituencies without power within the corporate 
polity—which is all of them other than stockholders—and the one with power—the 
stockholders—those elected by the stockholders bend to the will of their citizenry.  
And their citizenry is by statute, those who hold the corporation’s voting equity. 
 There are many examples of why the core power structure of corporate law 
translates into purpose.  Over the last decade or so, boards of directors who 
previously made clear that they believed in a classified board structure, have bowed 
to stockholder sentiment time and again, such that classified boards are becoming 
an extinguished species (Spencer Stuart, 2015).  That sort of bending to the winds 
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of stockholder sentiment is not anomalous, it is the overwhelming norm.  Thus, 
structural defenses have declined substantially, pay policies reflect the views de jour 
of institutional investors and their fellow travelers, and most activist campaigns end 
up with a victory, in whole or in part, by the activist, usually because the elected 
made concessions in the face of a potential fight before the electorate (Benoit, 2015).  
Off to the side in this slide toward a corporate governance system increasingly 
reflecting a direct democracy model—where immediate market sentiments are the 
major driver of policy on any contested issue—than a republican model involving a 
strong hand for the board, are the corporate constituencies other than stockholders.  
And in today’s markets, that means that human beings are off to the side, as most of 
the stockholders are not human beings, but other entities such as investment funds, 
mutual funds, and pension funds who act through agents every bit as subject to 
conflicts as the directors and managers of the corporations they influence.  The 
power that flows from the core reality that under American corporate statutes only 
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stockholders have clout has also been demonstrated outside Delaware.  Although 
many states have statutes that say that boards may consider the best interests of other 
constituencies as an equal end to stockholders, none of these states give other 
constituencies any power and it is therefore generally acknowledged that these 
statutes have done nothing meaningful to protect other constituencies (Velasco, 
2006; Springer, 1999; Bainbridge, 1992).  In short, in most circumstances, when 
scholars argue that boards already have the legal space to “do the right thing” and 
treat other constituencies as equal ends of governance, they are in effect arguing that 
boards should subordinate the board’s only constituency that has any statutory 
power—stockholders—to constituencies that the corporate law does not consider 
citizens of the corporate republic. 
II. 
 But, for purposes of this article, I wish to highlight one prominent example of 
why power is purpose within the corporate polity.  An example that is close to my 
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heart, as someone who came to the State of Delaware when he was nine years old 
and has spent much of his life in service to Delaware.  That is the example of what 
has happened to E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company—more commonly referred 
to today as DuPont—over the past few years.  In the remainder of this article I will 
sketch DuPont’s recent history, a history that illustrates how even a company with a 
track record of long-term investment and better-than-typical treatment of 
constituencies other than stockholders still, when push came to activist shareholder 
shove, chose to focus solely on the interests of one constituency—the constituency 
with all the power—stockholders. 
 One of the most influential corporations in the history of the United States, 
DuPont has been an engine for scientific innovation on many fronts.  Household 
products such as Nylon, Mylar, and Lycra owe their origins to DuPont and its 
scientists (DuPont, 2016).  And Delaware was the birthplace and long-standing 
home of DuPont. 
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 As with many American corporations, by this century, DuPont was well below 
its all-time high levels of employment—in no small part due to downsizings because 
of earlier stock market pressures—and certainly that was true in Delaware 
(Montgomery, 2015).  But entering this decade, DuPont remained one of, if not the 
most important, private sector employer in Delaware (Bunge, 2015).  At the center 
of our major business city, Wilmington, the DuPont Building stood proudly on 
Rodney Square.  The DuPont Building continued, until recently, to house the 
headquarters of the DuPont Company, as well as the eponymous Hotel DuPont and 
the DuPont Playhouse.  The Hotel remained a hallmark place to hold a wedding, a 
major community event, and was a special place to go for brunch.  And DuPont 
retained an interest in one of the country clubs it had originally started as a benefit 
for and way to attract employees. 
 Not only that, the DuPont Corporation, although not being as involved in 
community affairs as it had been in the past, seemed to have turned a business corner.  
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Its stock price was up substantially, the corporation was profitable, and there had 
been more stability in local employment (Bunge and Benoit, 2015; Solomon, 2015; 
Sonnenfeld, 2015).  Although the community missed the old DuPont, which was 
extremely active in the community, it was glad to continue to have DuPont, which 
continued to be a responsible and giving corporate citizen, even in the wake of 
globalization.  In fact, DuPont had its first Delaware native CEO in some time, and 
its first woman CEO ever, Ellen Kullman.  Consistent with its traditions, DuPont 
prided itself on core values of safety and health, environmental stewardship, the 
highest ethical behavior, and respect for people (DuPont, 2016).  The firm had a 
historic reputation as a “paternalistic employer who seemed to promise great pay, 
first-rate benefits and secure pensions guaranteed to last a lifetime” (Nagengast, 
2014). 
 Then came a big year for both DuPont and even more so for Delaware, in 
some ways: 2013.  The causal chain is debatable but two things happened for sure.  
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Nelson Peltz, one of the most respected activist investors, and his firm Trian Partners 
took a large equity interest in DuPont.2  While expressing support for Ellen Kullman 
and crediting her with taking steps to improve DuPont’s competitive position, Trian 
insisted that DuPont was underperforming on key metrics (Trian Fund Management 
L.P. et al., 2014).  Trian proposed reducing DuPont’s cost structure by, among other 
things, having it get out of the hotel, playhouse, and country club business (Trian 
Fund Management L.P. et al., 2014).  More fundamentally, Trian proposed breaking 
DuPont into three separate businesses.  In the same year, DuPont itself announced a 
partial breakup, by proposing to spin off its performance chemicals business, which 
                                                            
2 For the reader interested in the full details of the proxy fight between Trian and DuPont and its 
aftermath, the following sources are useful: two articles by the Wall Street Journal survey the 
fight: Bunge, J. and Benoit, D. (2015), ‘DuPont Repels Push by Peltz to Join Its Board’, Wall 
Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-repels-push-by-peltz-to-join-its-board-
1431562720; Bunge, J. and Benoit, D. (2015), ‘DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board fight’, Wall 
Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-appears-poised-to-win-over-peltz-
1431521564.  Both articles link to a gamut of coverage over the course of the fight.  For 
perspectives on how the proxy fight may effect the Delaware community surrounding DuPont, an 
article from Wilmington’s The News Journal provides a broad view on DuPont’s presence in the 
state: Goss, S. and Mordock, J. (2015), ‘Delaware’s dilemma: A fading DuPont’, The News 
Journal, http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/industries/2015/10/23/delawares-
dilemma-fading-dupont /74329022/.  For those interested in a more financial perspective, Harvard 
Business School wrote a case study on Trian’s intervention with DuPont.  Viceria, L., Dhruva, K., 
and Lee, P. (2016), ‘Trian Partners and DuPont,’ Harvard Business School Case 216-077. 
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it gave the name The Chemours Company (Stynes, 2014).  For Delaware, that 
proposed spin off presaged obvious problems because even though Trian had 
questioned why DuPont itself—a conglomerate chemicals company—needed a 
hotel, country club and theater, DuPont planned to abandon its Wilmington 
headquarters building to Chemours, head for the suburbs, and leave the much smaller 
spin off with that “asset,” formerly called “DuPont’s front door” (Milford and 
Starkey, 2014), for which Chemours had no need, all the while also trying to sell or 
give away the theater, hotel, and country club (Kalesse, 2016; Mordock, 2015).  
When DuPont successfully passed off the DuPont Playhouse to a local nonprofit, it 
insisted that its name be removed from the theater (Kalesse, 2016). 
 After some period of engagement, Trian and DuPont eventually went to 
separate corners and squared off for a proxy fight.  Trian’s case was as mentioned:  
It argued that although DuPont had done decently well in recent years, it was still 
lagging industry competitors, had an excessive cost structure, and would do better if 
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it was broken up (Trian Fund Management, L.P. et al., 2015).  Trian offered to be a 
partner with DuPont management in implementing this new strategy (Trian Fund 
Management, L.P. et al., 2015).  But, it wanted Mr. Peltz himself to serve as a 
director (Trian Fund Management, L.P. et al., 2015).  Somehow viewing Peltz—an 
accomplished corporate manager himself who had come to be regarded as a valuable 
and constructive colleague in other similar situations when he was added to the board 
(Benoit, 2015; Weiss, 2013)—as beyond the pale, DuPont would not settle if Peltz 
himself insisted on serving (Trian Fund Management, L.P. et al., 2015).   
 Instead, CEO Kullman went to the market with her own platform.  On the 
business side, she pushed the benefits of her own cost-cutting agenda, including the 
Chemours spin off, and disavowed that it was influenced at all by the emergence of 
Trian as a large stockholder (DuPont, 2015).  The company, as is now standard, went 
to proxy advisors and investment funds with its own pitch about its future 
performance, and how investors would be better off sticking with management.  And 
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knowing that Trian had proposed new directors for its slate with serious managerial 
experience who investors might find attractive, DuPont identified two new 
candidates for its management slate.  Edward Breen had been chairman and CEO of 
Tyco from 2002 to 2012.  DuPont heralded Tyco’s 703% total shareholder returns 
during his tenure but failed to mention that Breen’s tenure also saw Tyco break apart 
into five companies (DuPont, 2015).  James Gallogly had shepherded another 
chemicals company, LyondellBasel, through Chapter 11 with, as DuPont noted, 
similarly positive outcomes for shareholders: 593% total returns during his tenure 
(DuPont, 2015). 
 An expensive and high-profile proxy contest ensued.  During that proxy 
contest, DuPont called on institutional investors to think long term and stand by its 
plan, which it argued was in the best interests of typical American investors whose 
money is stuck in the market for decades and who depend on sustainable long-term 
growth fueled by deep investments in research and development (DuPont, 2015).  
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DuPont argued that Trian’s plan could interfere with long term growth by cutting 
needed R & D investments and the potential for synergies in innovation among 
DuPont’s diverse base of research scientists, saying things like Trian’s proposal 
“would destroy our innovation platform, diminish global reach, weaken our brand 
and reduce our opportunity to drive revenue through cross-selling” (DuPont, 2015).  
At the same time, DuPont looked for support from its employees and home 
communities, arguing that it was committed to them and Delaware (DuPont, 2015).  
DuPont placed an ad in the Wilmington News Journal reminding “our neighbors, 
colleagues and shareholders” that DuPont was a “proud pillar of the greater 
Wilmington community,” “a leader in this community,” and expressed a desire to be 
“a strong, contributing corporate citizen and one of the best places to work for 
Delawareans for many years to come” (DuPont, 2015).  Trian retorted that its 
interests were “fully aligned with . . . the greater Wilmington community” (Trian 
Fund Management, L.P. et al., 2015). 
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 It all ended in a close “victory” for DuPont.  Its proposed slate, including new 
members Breen and Gallogly, won.  The Trian slate, including Peltz himself, was 
narrowly defeated.  The close victory divided the investment community.  DuPont 
pulled out its narrow victory with support from three major money managers 
Vanguard Group, Blackrock, and State Street, even though the two major proxy 
advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, recommended that stockholders vote with 
Trian (Bunge and Benoit, 2015).  Fidelity Investments and Capital Research were 
two notable money managers who sided with Trian and the proxy advisor 
recommendation (Bunge and Benoit, 2015).  Ellen Kullman was hailed by some in 
the national and local press as a heroic CEO, who had sailed bravely into the winds 
of prevailing sentiment and stood up for traditional values (Milford, 2015; 
Sonnenfeld, 2015). 
 But, victory would not be a word many would put on the struggle’s aftermath, 
at least not for the other constituencies of DuPont.  For starters, Delaware had to deal 
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with the fall-out of what DuPont had either done on its own without being influenced 
by Trian, or had been influenced to help DuPont prevail against Trian in a proxy 
fight.   
 The spin-off Chemours immediately struggled and made clear that it was not 
obligated to stay headquartered in Wilmington and might not do so (Mordock, 2015).  
With the departure of DuPont itself from the DuPont Building to the suburbs, 
employment in the DuPont Building in the center of Wilmington declined, both in 
terms of overall jobs, but also in terms of average wages.  This departure from 
Wilmington by DuPont came at a vulnerable time for Wilmington, which was 
struggling with a spiraling crime rate and declines in banking employment. 
 Chemours also closed its Edgemoor plant in Delaware (Rainey, 2015) and 
reduced employment (Pizzi and Mordock, 2015).  As of now, Chemours has 
announced it intends to stay in Delaware.  But, as we shall see, it has only done so 
after subjecting Delaware to an auction process involving other states and 
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communities.  And as of now, it is not clear that Chemours will remain in the DuPont 
Building on Rodney Square, leaving the potential for the Square’s prime property to 
be without a major tenant (Pizzi and Mordock, 2015).  Consistent with this tenuous 
situation, the future of the Hotel DuPont and its Playhouse are insecure, although the 
community itself has stepped up to help the Playhouse continue (DiStefano, 2015).  
The head of the organization now operating the Playhouse heralded this community 
spirit, observing that the Playhouse’s new “secret weapon” was the close to 200 
strong corps of volunteer ushers with “infectious,” “sincere enthusiasm” (Kalesse, 
2016).  In this process, not much has been heard from DuPont itself about any 
obligations it owes to Wilmington, or Delaware more generally. 
 At DuPont itself, Kullman and her management team had no chance to savor 
their win.  Having put an aggressive case on the street to win the proxy fight, DuPont 
was not well-positioned to meet its targets in the face of adversity.  And adversity 
hit in the form of a strong U.S. dollar and a weaker agricultural market, and DuPont 
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was soon failing to meet the earnings targets it had put out in the proxy fight 
(Mordock, 2016).   
 Within a year of supposed triumph, Kullman found herself on the outs, with 
the DuPont board having discovered that new director, Ed Breen, was a better CEO 
and that their prior stated view of what was good for the company was, well, now 
wrong.  Almost immediately upon ascending to that post, Breen gave an interview 
indicating that he had been thinking since he joined the DuPont board about a 
transaction in which DuPont would merge with its industry rival and fellow target 
of insurgent investors, Dow Chemical Company, and then break the combined 
company into three pieces: an agriculture business (“Agriculture”), a specialty 
products business (“Specialty Products”)—including products such as Kevlar and 
solar panel components, and a materials science business (“Materials”)—including 
products like resins and certain kinds of plastics (Mordock, et al., 2016; Faber, 
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2015).  This noodling had not formed part of the proxy materials offered in support 
of Breen’s election. 
 Breen’s assumption to the CEO position and his eventual announcement that 
DuPont and Dow were merging of course pleased Trian, as his plan largely echoed 
Trian’s plan (Bunge et al., 2015).  Trian, in fact, announced its full support, viewing 
the transaction as “a great outcome for all shareholders” (Bunge et al., 2015). 
 Not so lucky, however, were DuPont’s workers, to whom strong appeals to be 
loyal had been made during the proxy fight.  Between Christmas and New Year’s 
Eve 2015, the historically paternalistic Uncle Dupie (Milford, 2015) was more like 
pre-reform Scrooge and announced that 1,700 workers in Delaware would be given 
pink slips.  Unlike many Americans, most of these workers could not be faulted for 
failing to have skills that are relevant in an increasingly sophisticated, science- , and 
technology-intensive world.  Many of these workers had doctoral degrees from 
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leading research universities, and many others had applied science skills (Benderly, 
2016). 
 Almost as importantly, DuPont and Dow (which was under much more severe 
market pressure than DuPont and had made large layoffs itself) made clear that bids 
to keep their downsized operations, after the merger and break-up, would be 
considered.  That is, if the communities that had been the home of their historical 
business operations wanted to keep them, they should reach into the pockets of their 
other taxpayers to make that happen. 
 Out of this bidding war came a preliminary agreement whereby Delaware 
would be headquarters of two of the three spin-off businesses:  Specialty Products 
and Agriculture.  Midland, Michigan, Dow’s long time home and a town even more 
dependent on Dow than Wilmington was on DuPont, would be home to Materials.  
Meanwhile, Chemours also leveraged Delaware by openly pondering a move of its 
headquarters to New Jersey or Pennsylvania (Mordock, 2016).  In fairness to 
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Chemours’ managers, it must be acknowledged that DuPont had left it with assets 
that were not assets to it, such as the DuPont Building and a hefty amount of legacy 
DuPont liabilities.  If DuPont itself had no compunction about asking Delaware 
taxpayers to subsidize it, expecting more of Chemours would have been more the 
stuff of hope, than of market logic. 
 As the price for Delaware of keeping the combined Specialty Products and 
Agriculture businesses and Chemours, Delaware’s General Assembly passed 
legislation that would give DuPont important tax benefits and cost the state over $57 
million in revenues over four years—material funds in the context of Delaware’s 
tight budget situation (Mordock, 2016).  These state-level benefits were also 
accompanied by concessions at the county and state level.  Likewise, Iowa provided 
a package of loans and grants that will cost taxpayers $17.2 million over several 
years in exchange for a promise that the 2,600 jobs at DuPont Pioneer in that state 
were safe (Doering and Hardy, 2016).  Indiana too offered a package of incentives 
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aimed at keeping elements of the new agriculture business in the state (Doering and 
Hardy, 2016). 
 If asked whether we prefer to keep what we can of DuPont or not, 
Delawareans would be overwhelmingly in favor of keeping DuPont.  I am strongly 
in that camp myself, and I know how hard and how fast our elected officials worked 
to do the best they could by our community in a very difficult, urgent situation. 
 But, the best way to look at the outcome is like this.  Imagine your spouse 
comes home and says, “I will stay with you and be three-quarters as loving in the 
future if you give me a new sports car each year.”  You might do it, but feel good 
about it? 
 For present purposes, what is most important about this scenario is that it 
illustrates the reality of how power dictates purpose in our corporate governance 
system.  No court was ever going to make DuPont’s board bend to the electorate’s 
will.  And that board had just been elected and had room until the next election.  
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DuPont was not in financial distress and the headwinds it faced did not threaten its 
solvency or ability to deliver strong returns in the future.  The proxy contest’s 
outcome revealed that this was a debate about whether a profitable company could 
be made even more profitable. 
 But when it came down to it, the DuPont board knew who called the shots and 
surrendered the direction of the company to the prevailing market winds.  They 
knew, as they had long known by downsizing and taking other actions that adversely 
affected other constituencies over prior decades (Goss and Mordock, 2015), that they 
were expected to make their end the best interests of their investors, even if that 
meant hurting other constituencies.  And they were not willing to further fight for 
their previous view of what was best for stockholders in particular, much less the 
company’s other constituencies. 
 And, therefore, it was without any apology or shame that DuPont and Dow 
not only presented their historic home communities with gut-wrenching job losses, 
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facility closures that threatened to hollow out towns, and all the damage to other 
businesses that came with those decisions, but then asked those home communities 
to go into the pockets of ordinary taxpayers. 
 Revealing that stockholders are by no means residual claimants, DuPont and 
Dow were able to extract exemptions from their pre-existing legal obligations as 
citizens to pay taxes.  The diminished taxes the corporations will pay will be made 
up by other taxpayers, either by paying higher taxes or by having their governments 
delivered reduced services.  The new corporate “residue” does not come from 
managerial ingenuity, it comes from the leverage exerted by DuPont and Dow over 
their home communities, leverage exerted on behalf of only corporate constituency. 
 This story is not about bad people.  I have long considered myself fortunate 
to live in a community where DuPont was headquartered.  If I were put under oath, 
I would bet that the DuPont board was more community-regarding than the typical 
public company board, and that that was even more so of its long-term managers.  
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But, it is telling that when it mattered, not one element of the DuPont board spoke 
up in any public or meaningful way to go to bat for the company’s workers, or to 
say it is one thing for us to do this, it is another for us to go hat in hand and to ask 
Delaware, Michigan, and Iowa to give us money when we are reducing employment 
and cutting facilities.   
 Vilifying those who work within a power structure for being responsive to its 
clear design is not only unfair, it is unproductive.  There was no braking power given 
to DuPont or Dow’s employees or historic communities to impede the pressure being 
applied by an aggressive stock market.  Ultimately, the fate of those companies was 
always subject to determination by their only citizens, who are the ones who control 
the voting of their stock. 
 Trust me, I get it that is difficult to read the following sentence from someone, 
Ed Breen, who had far less invested in reality in DuPont than any long-term 
Delaware resident: “DuPont will be prominently mentioned in the new name going 
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forward . . . [i]t is nice for the employees that work here and it keeps continuity here.  
Our 213-year history is going to continue” (Mordock et al., 2016).  But, the only 
factual error in that statement, by a person who had first joined DuPont as a director 
only the year before, is that in terms of actual power over DuPont, the “our” can only 
really be used by those who can muster a majority of the company’s voting power.  
Even as to the managers and directors, they are highly paid drivers of the corporate 
machine, who hold the keys only as long as they please the market. 
 If, as many of us believe, it would be more socially useful for corporations to 
be more accountable to their workers, their communities, their consumers, and to 
society generally than now is the case, then it is important that we be clear-eyed.  If 
we wish corporations to be able to pursue long-term strategies with fewer disruptions 
from shifting momentary market concerns, then it is time for corporate scholars and 
commentators to make money managers be faithful representatives of the ordinary 
human beings whose long-term capital they control.  If we wish to protect workers, 
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consumers, and the environment, then it is time to reinvigorate and extend the legal 
protections for these constituencies, both within and without corporate law, and to 
make corporations compete on a fair playing field in which all must treat these 
important concerns with dignity and respect. 
 But, what will not help any worker, consumer, or the environment is 
pretending that American corporate law makes them all an equal end of corporate 
governance.  That is just not true.   
 Genuine concern for those other constituencies requires facing the truth and 
supporting changes in the power dynamics affecting corporate governance and 
behavior that make due regard for them a required obligation for the conduct of 
business.  
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